Gale, Kuhn and Tucker [1] introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies with respect to a probability distribution on them. In terms of value, they gave conditions for a desirable reduction. We show that a probability distribution for a desirable reduction relies on optimal strategies in the original game. Also, we correct an improper example given by them to show that the reverse of a theorem does not hold.
Introduction
Reducing the size of a game without affecting its instrinsic properties such as the Nash equilibria, the value, and the optimal strategies, is desirable from the viewpoint of computation and modelling players' bounded rationality. In their seminal paper [1] , Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (GKT) introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies with respect to some probability distribution on them. A reduction is desirable if optimal strategies of the original game are restorable from those of it. The main results there are conditions for a desirable reduction in terms of value. However, they did not relate that condition with the probability distribution, which leaves the practicability of their reductions in question. Also, a 2 × 2 game intended to show the reverse of a theorem does not hold is improper, which leaves their claim unverified.
This note tries to remedy those defects. We show that a probability distribution for a desirabe reduction relies on optimal strategies of the original game, which gives a negative answer to the practicability of GKT's reductions. Also, we show that it is impossible to find a proper example for their claim in 2 × 2 games, and give a proper one which is a 4 × 4 game. Finally, we discuss some extensions of their results.
Reductions of Zero-Sum Game

Elementary Reduction
Let G = (S 1 , S 2 ; u 1 , u 2 ) be a two-person zero-sum game, with associated mixed strategy sets M 1 and M 2 . We denote by v(G) the value of G, i.e., v(G) = max
GKT introduced two reductions on pure strategy sets. The first one is elementary reduction. Let S ′ 1 ⊆ S 1 with S ′ 1 = ∅., and p 1 a probability distribution over S ′ 1 . We define
where α is a newly introduced strategy, and S
We say that G p 1 is obtained from G by an elementary player 1 reduction (ER1 ). The intended meaning of G p 1 is that we package strategies in S ′ 1 and introduce a representative α which is a mechanism that chooses a strategy randomly in S ′ 1 by p 1 . The payoff by choosing α is the expectation on S
The purpuse for reduction is to make it easier to find out optimal strategies. Hence we need to know when optimal strategies are preserved, or when optimal strategies of the original game are restorable from those of the reduced game. GKT gave a necessary and sufficient condition for that as follows:
(2) For each optimal strategies x
is also an optimal strategy in G if and
Then it is natural to ask:
What property should such a p 1 satisfy? To answer them, we have the following statement:
there is some optimal strategy x 1 such that p 1 (s 1 ) =
To show it, we need the following lemma. 
It can be seen that x
1 is an optimal strategy for player 1 in G p 1 , and
1 be an optimal strategy in G p 1 and
and by Theorem 2.1 (2), x 1 is an optimal strategy of G, it can be seen for each s 1 ∈ S ′ 1 ,
(2) Let p 1 be a probability distribution on S ′ 1 , and x 1 an optimal strategy of G with
Theorem 2.2 casts some doubt on the usefulness of GKT's Theorem 2.1 since it suggests that a desirable reduction needs detailed and complete information of the optimal strategy in the original game. Since the purpose of reduction is to make it easier to find an optimal strategy, why bother to reduce it if we have already known all of them? It may be helpful in the sense that it allows us to eliminate all irrationalizable strategies, i.e., iteratedly eliminate strictly dominated strategies (cf. Pearce [3] ). However, still there are strategies which survive iterated elimination are assigned 0 in some optimal strategy, and therefore we cannot exhaust all desirable reductions.
Reduction
GKT extended ER. Let S i = {S i1 , ..., S iℓ 1 } be a partition of S i (i = 1, 2). For t = 1, ..., ℓ 1 , let p 1t be a probability distribution over S 1t , and p 1 = (p 11 , ..., p 1ℓ 1 ). Define s 2 ) , and u 
1 ) is also optimal in G, then there exists some optimal strategy x 1 in G such that for each S 1k ∈ S 1 ,
∈S 1k
for each s 1k ∈ S 1k ;
, then p 1k can be any probability distribution over S 1k . Theorem 2.4 can be proved in a similar way as the only-if part of Theorem 2.2 (1) and (2) . Its reverse does not hold. Consider the Matching Pennies game G and p 1 in Example 2.1. It can be seen that p 1 is generated from the optimal strategy ( ) of G. However, as shown above, not every optimal strategy in G p 1 corresponds to an optimal one on in G. Theorem 2.4 casts deeper doubt on Theorem 2.3 than that by Theorem 2.2 to Theorem 2.1 since it implies that even complete information on optimal strategies in G is not enough; a desirable R1 requires a selection on optimal strategies and "proper" partitions of S 1 .
Some Remarks
Both reductions can be defined two-sidedly by iteratedly applying the definitions, and results in this note can be extended there. Also, they can be extended to zero-sum games with continuum of strategies. For general n-person games, our results hold by replacing restorability of optimal strategies by that of Nash equilibria, which can be seen as an extension of Mertens' [2] small world axiom.
It is wondered whether we can replace the minimum value in the definition of E1 by other ways, e.g., maximum, median, and what is the condition for a desirable reduction. Furthermore, whether there is some desirable reduction which does not rely on the optimal strategies of the original game. We are looking forward for future works in those directions.
